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ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS FOR THE
PSYCHIATRIST: CONFIDENTIALITY,
PRIVILEGE, AND PRIVACY IN PSYCHIATRIC
TREATMENT
Robert Sadofj

I. INTRODUCTION
In the case at hand, Ben Jones confessed to his psychiatrist, Dr.
Jennifer Palmer, that he had been the one who actually killed the
police officer during an aborted bank robbery. Jones was aware that
Frank Smith had been falsely accused, tried, and convicted of the
offense for which Mr. Jones was responsible. He was also aware that
Frank Smith was scheduled to die in three days by execution. He told
his psychiatrist that he was responsible for the killing and did not
believe that Frank Smith should die for this crime. He also revealed
that he had consulted his attorney and his minister prior to coming to
this regularly scheduled session that he had had with Dr. Palmer since
his release from prison. Mr. Jones was currently facing trial on drug
offenses and had a long history of various drug offenses and robberies
to obtain money for his drug addiction. He was looking for some
"deal" in order to avoid a lengthy sentence under the new guidelines.
What about the ethical duty of the psychiatrist in this complex
situation? First, the psychiatrist has an ethical duty of confidentiality-for example, not to disclose the information learned in the course
of treating a patient-unless mandated by law or in order to protect
the patient or others in the community. Although section 9 of the
Principlesof Medical Ethics has been repealed, its text illustrates the
strong concept of confidentiality to which psychiatrists are still held.
Specifically, section 9, as applied to psychiatrists, stated the following:
A physician may not reveal the confidences entrusted to him
in the course of medical attendance, or the deficiencies he
* Clinical Professor of Psychiatry and Director, Center for Studies in Social-Legal
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may observe in the character of patients, unless he is
required to do so by law or unless it becomes necessary in
order to protect the welfare of the individual or of the
community.'
Thus, without the patient's expressed permission, the psychiatrist may
not unilaterally disclose information obtained in the course of
psychiatric treatment.
Second, the patient has a privilege in most states with respect to
the psychotherapist-patient relationship or the physician-patient
relationship. 2 However, very few states have a specific psychotherapist-patient privilege which prohibits the psychiatrist from
testifying against his patient without the patient's permission or
without the patient waiving this privilege.'
Third, the patient has a right to the privacy of the patient's
medical records in the event Dr. Palmer took notes and wrote
information given to her in the course of treating Mr. Jones. That is,
her records on her patient may not be disclosed except under court
order.
In looking at these three areas that regulate psychiatric practice,
we may analyze each as regarding aspects of confidentiality, privilege,
and privacy.
A.

Confidentiality

Confidentiality is an ethical duty of the psychiatrist, unless it is
breached whereby it becomes a legal issue. That is, if a psychiatrist
breaches his or her duty of confidentiality to the patient, and the
patient is damaged as a result of that inappropriate disclosure, the
patient may sue the psychiatrist for malpractice in deviating from the
standard of care. Most psychiatrists hold this duty to be relatively
sacred-not to be violated under most conditions. However, the
statement of ethics for physicians allows an escape from absolute
secrecy by requiring confidentiality, "unless ...required ... by law

or [where] necessary in order to protect the welfare of the individual
or of the community."4 What this means for psychiatrists is that when

1.

PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 9 (Am. Med. Ass'n 1957) (repealed 1980).

2. Laural C. Alexander, Should Alabama Adopt a Physician.PatientPrivilege?, 45
ALA. L. REV.261,265 (1993).
3. SCOTt N. STONE & ROBERT K. TAYLOR, 2 TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 7.09 (2d

ed. 1995).
4. PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 1, § 9.
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the court mandates disclosure through court order, the psychiatrist
may have little or no choice but to disclose in order to avoid a
contempt of court citation. The other part of the exception is to
"protect the welfare of the individual or of the community" 5
Certainly, in cases of suicidal threat, behavior, or potential, the
psychiatrist has a duty to save the life of the patient by disclosure in
order to effectively protect the patient through hospitalization or
other means.
For the psychiatrist to protect the welfare of the community, the
psychiatrist must disclose when identifiable third parties are threatened by the patient in the course of therapy. These are the so-called
"Tarasoff Cases" that originated in California in the mid-1970s and
spread across the country in various forms, 6 deviating from the
original Tarasoff case in which a specific threat was made in the
course of therapy against an identifiable third party.7 In Tarasoff v.
Regents of the University of California,the California Supreme Court
stated clearly the duty of the psychiatrist to protect that third party
from the violence of the patient. However, other courts have
modified Tarasoff to include violence to third parties that was never
disclosed in the course of therapy or when general threats are made
in therapy and no specific third party is identified. Most recently, in
Schuster v. Altenberg,8 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated that
"[o]nce negligence is established, the defendant is liable for unforeseeable consequences as well as ...

to unforseeable plaintiffs."9 That

ruling appears to put an undue burden on the practicing psychiatrist
who may not be aware of the potential violence of his or her patient.
Nevertheless, courts have mandated that psychiatrists "protect"
third parties who are threatened by patients in the course of therapy.
The ethical duty of the psychiatrist is to protect the welfare of the
community. Does Frank Smith, sentenced to die in three days,
represent "the community" that Dr. Palmer needs to protect? Can
5. Id.
6. See, eg., Bradley Ctr., Inc. v. Wessner, 296 S.E.2d 693 (Ga. 1982); Bardoni v. Kim,
390 N.W.2d 218 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); McIntosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1979); Peck v. Counseling Serv., 499 A.2d 422 (Vt. 1985). "A Tarasoff-type duty
has been adopted in 23 states, in addition to California .... " Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d
302, 307 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
7. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14 (1976).
8. 424 N.W.2d 159 (Wis. 1988).
9. Id. at 164 (quoting A.E. Invest. Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 214 N.W.2d 764,766
(Wis. 1974)).
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Dr. Palmer legally and ethically disclose the information given by Mr.
Jones in the course of therapy in order to save Frank Smith's life?
Clearly, this would be a breach of confidentiality in the course of
treatment. However, is this breach of confidentiality justified by the
potential for saving the life of an innocent man?
Some psychiatrists would clearly disclose this information based
on a belief that they have a higher duty to protect Frank Smith than
to protect the confidentiality of Mr. Jones. They would decide, on
higher moral grounds, that they must disclose under these rigorous
circumstances.
Other psychiatrists would adhere strictly to the rules of confidentiality and never disclose without the patient's permission. They
would not interpret Frank Smith as being part of the community in
need of protection and would believe very strongly that they have no
duty to disclose this information. In fact, they would believe they
have a duty to withhold this information in the interest of their belief
in professional confidentiality.
The latter group of psychiatrists, in order to achieve a just end,
would undoubtedly attempt to get Mr. Jones to disclose on his own,
thereby achieving justice without breaching confidentiality. However,
Mr. Jones is not about to disclose on his own, and it is unlikely that
he could be persuaded by Dr. Palmer to do so in order to protect
Frank Smith. Mr. Jones is looking out for his best interest and
obviously feels torn in that he has consulted his attorney, his minister,
and his psychiatrist.
B. Privilege

Under the doctrine of privileged communications, it is unclear
what Dr. Palmer's duty would be to Mr. Jones with respect to various
jurisdictions. Different states have different privilege statutes, some
being more stringent than others by prohibiting the psychiatrist from
testifying about this information without the patient's consent. 10
Other states have broader privilege statutes, including Pennsylvania,
which states that a physician may not testify against a patient without
the patient's consent if that testimony "tend[s] to blacken the character of the patient."" Clearly, Dr. Palmer's testimony would "blacken
the character" of Mr. Jones. It is unknown from the data whether the

10. See STONE & TAYLOR, supra note 3, § 7.09.
11. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5929 (1982).
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authorities are aware that Dr. Palmer is treating Mr. Jones. It is
unclear whether Mr. Jones was released on parole from the last time
he was in prison and started therapy in the prison and then was
referred to Dr. Palmer for subsequent treatment. In some cases the
parole officer is aware of the existence of the therapist and the
regularity of therapy as part of the conditions for parole. If the
authorities are aware that Dr. Palmer is treating Mr. Jones, they may
make some formal request for the records of treatment, which may
include the disclosures and confession given by Mr. Jones to Dr.
Palmer about his role in the killing of the police officer during the
aborted bank robbery.
C. Privacy
Mr. Jones's right to privacy includes the privacy of his medical
records. Those records may not be released by Dr. Palmer to anyone
without Mr. Jones's consent. However, a court may order Dr. Palmer
to release her records to the court if the court believes there is
relevant information in the records, but the court may not go "on a
fishing expedition" without a sound basis for ordering the records. In
In re Lifschutz,12 the California Supreme Court ordered Dr.
Lifschutz to send his records to the judge to be reviewed in camera
after Dr. Lifschutz was held in contempt for refusing to give over his
records after a court order and a failure of all appeals. 3 Dr.
Lifschutz believed that these records were inviolable and could not be
given to courts even in the face of a court order. 4 He was protecting not only the rights of this particular patient to withhold these
records, but the rights of all patients whom he felt had the right to
absolute secrecy and privacy when speaking with their psychiatrists.
After reviewing the record in camera,the judge in Dr. Lifschutz's case
decided the records were not relevant or material to the case at
hand. 5 Dr. Lifshutz was released from prison and his records were
not utilized in the case.
In In re B,'6 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a
lower court judge could not obtain the records of Dr. Roth's patient

12. 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970).
13. 1L at 439, 467 P.2d at 573, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
14. AL at 420, 467 P.2d at 559, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
15. See SAMUEL KNAPP & LEON VAN DE CREEK, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS IN
THE MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONS 67 (1987).
16. 394 A.2d 419 (Pa. 1978).
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without her consent merely because the judge believed the records
may be relevant in the case. 17 Even a lower court judge may not go
on a fishing expedition without proper cause to seek those records.18
II. DISCUSSION
What can the psychiatrist do to help her patient and protect the
life of Frank Smith, if that is possible? The first thing Dr. Palmer

should do upon hearing this "confession" by Mr. Jones is to determine its validity. Is Mr. Jones delusional? Is he fantasizing? Or is
he deliberately lying to his psychiatrist? Presumably, Dr. Palmer
knows her patient from treating him since his release from prison.
She would have ruled out any question of psychosis that would result
in a delusional system about Frank Smith and the killing of the police
officer. She would also know whether Mr. Jones is prone to fantasy
or whether he has a history of malingering. There would appear to
be no valid reason for Mr. Jones to deliberately lie about killing a
police officer in the course of a robbery. Thus, it would be important
for Dr. Palmer initially to ascertain the validity of these statements
before she proceeds. She may further validate the truthfulness of the
statements through her consultation with Claire Hopewell, Mr. Jones's
attorney.
If Dr. Palmer determines that Mr. Jones's confession is valid, it
is recommended that Dr. Palmer seek to have Mr. Jones disclose this
information to the authorities on his own. If he is unwilling to do so,
Dr. Palmer should try to convince him to cooperate to the best of his
ability in order to save Frank Smith's life. The psychiatrist, having
been told that Mr. Jones consulted his attorney and his minister
earlier that day, may request permission from Mr. Jones to consult
with the minister and the attorney in order to determine Mr. Jones's
legal rights and his best interest in this case. If Mr. Jones agrees, it
is recommended that a meeting of the three professionals occur to
determine what is the best course of action. Perhaps the three of
them together could convince Mr. Jones to disclose the information
that would save Frank Smith's life. If that fails, then it seems to me
the psychiatrist would be left to her own decision regarding disclosure.
Some psychiatrists would strictly adhere to the standard of confidentiality and would never disclose unless mandated by law. Other

17. IA at 426.
18. l
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psychiatrists would rationalize that Frank Smith is part of the general
"community" and would disclose, under the duty to protect the
welfare of the community, including Frank Smith. A third group of
psychiatrists would disclose because they would feel a higher moral
duty to do so in order to save Frank Smith's life, irrespective of the
issue of confidentiality or "duty to protect."
How else may the psychiatrist help Mr. Jones? In consulting with
Mr. Jones's attorney, Claire Hopewell, she may help in the newer
concept of "three strikes and you're out" philosophy recently
employed by some states.19 Dr. Palmer may be able to show that
many of Mr. Jones's previous crimes were all related to his drug
addiction. She may be able to show the seriousness of his mental
condition that requires intensive therapy, and thereby mitigate his
sentence for his current drug charges. She may also be able to help
Mr. Jones in his murder case if he confesses and is tried for the killing
of the police officer during the bank robbery. She may be able to
show that Mr. Jones was under the influence of drugs at the time of
the aborted bank robbery and that the killing was done without full
mental capacity. She may be able to help Mr. Jones's lawyer
negotiate with the prosecutor a guilty plea in the murder in exchange
for a life sentence rather than a full trial, which may lead to the death
penalty for Mr. Jones.
III. CONCLUSION

Without the information that Frank Smith is about to be
executed for a crime that Mr. Jones had committed, there would be
no problem for the psychiatrist. She would not disclose the information because it would violate her duty to her patient. However, the
fact that another man's life is in jeopardy poses a moral dilemma for
Dr. Palmer. How can she protect the rights of her patient and still
protect the welfare and the life of Frank Smith? Which has priority?
If she is able to effect, with the cooperation of Mr. Jones's attorney
and the prosecutor, a negotiated guilty plea in exchange for a life
sentence for Mr. Jones, saving the life of Frank Smith appears to be
justified.
Thus, by allowing Dr. Palmer to discuss the case with his
attorney, Mr. Jones may be able to effect a satisfactory conclusion to
this dilemma and still save the life of Frank Smith.

19. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West Supp. 1996).
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In a case of this type, the treating psychiatrist must be aware of
the regulations of confidentiality, privilege, and privacy governing the
practice of psychiatry. The psychiatrist should also be aware of the
issues and parameters of criminal law that may permit helping the
patient. In this case the psychiatrist should take a proactive position
rather than a passive stance of resignation that nothing can be done
because of the rules governing the practice of psychiatry. As noted
in the ethics for psychiatrists, exceptions to the confidentiality rule
exist that are relevant and appropriate in this case.

